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Abstract We provide the first estimates of the effect of foreign ownership on
wages in Germany, controlling for the observed and unobserved characteristics of
workers and plants. We also test whether the wage gains from joining a foreign-
owned firm are subsequently lost when leaving that firm, and we examine whether
wage gains vary across the sample. We find large selection effects in terms of
worker and plant components of wages. Once the selection effect is taken into
account, the takeover effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from
zero.
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JEL Classification F23  J31  C23
1 Introduction
There is now an extensive literature which suggests that foreign-owned plants
outperform domestic plants and pay higher wages. A common finding is that the
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wage differential is partly explained by differences in other characteristics which are
themselves correlated with foreign ownership. For example, foreign-owned plants
tend to be larger and operate in sectors of the economy which are inherently more
productive. It is therefore important to control for plant size and sector when
comparing the wages and productivity of foreign- and domestic-owned plants. Since
these characteristics are often observable in plant-level data, controlling for these
differences is straightforward in a regression framework.
Foreign and domestic plants might also differ in their unobservable character-
istics. In particular, plants which are taken into foreign ownership might already be
outperforming plants which are not taken over. With repeated observations at the
plant level, it is possible to remove the influence of any time-invariant difference
between plants which become foreign-owned and those which remain domestic by
using difference-in-differences (DiD) or fixed effects (FE) techniques. However, it
is difficult with plant-level data to control for time-varying differences in the quality
of the workforce, which may explain some of the apparent foreign-ownership wage
differential.
More recently, the availability of linked employer–employee data (hereafter
LEED) has allowed analysis at the worker-level which includes both plant- and
worker-level controls. In this paper we present the first estimates of the foreign-
ownership wage effect in Germany using LEED.
Our estimation methods allow us to investigate a number of other important
issues in this literature. First, we can examine whether the wage gain from
ownership status is lost when workers move from foreign-owned to domestic plants.
The standard estimation techniques used in the literature generally impose an equal
and opposite effect on wages of movement into and out of foreign-owned plants.
But if wage gains are the result of, for example, human capital accumulation, we
would expect that the wage gains of joining a foreign-owned plant would not be lost
on leaving that plant.1
Second, we can investigate whether there are any distributional consequences of
ownership status. For example, foreign-owned plants may implement a steeper
wage-tenure profile, or they may change relative rewards to different skill groups.
Third, we can directly estimate whether movers and stayers experience equal
benefits from foreign ownership.
Finally, data from the former East Germany provides an interesting test-bed,
because we observe plants acquired by both West German and foreign firms. This
allows us to see whether the (presumed) technological advantage of overseas firms
applies within as well as between countries. For example, it has been argued that
foreign-owned firms face a higher fixed entry cost, and so only relatively high
productivity foreign-owned firms will enter the overseas market.
We find evidence of large selection effects both in terms of worker and plant
unobserved components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign firms have
higher wages before they are taken over. The selection effect is larger for plants in
1 Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) note that the movement of workers from foreign-owned to domestic
plants might be a source of so-called ‘‘spillovers’’. Fosfuri et al. (2001, p. 206) argue that ‘‘. . . evidence
on spillovers due to workers’ mobility is scarce and far from conclusive.’’
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East Germany. Once the selection effect is taken into account, the genuine takeover
effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from zero in East
Germany. The takeover effect is actually slightly larger in West Germany.
The paper is structured as follows. We summarise previous estimates of the wage
effect in Sect. 2, and we present a framework for measuring wage effects in Sect.3
which explores the different empirical issues which may arise. Section 4 briefly
describes the data we use, and our estimates are presented in Sect. 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature review
As noted, there is now a wide range of estimates of the wage impact of foreign
affiliates. Earlier studies tend to use industry-level or plant-level data. More
recently, the availability of LEED has allowed analysis at the worker-level which
includes both plant- and worker-level controls.
The studies can be classified according to the identification of the ownership
wage differential. The first method compares wages (or wage growth) between
foreign-owned and domestic-owned plants, which is typically carried out by OLS.
In this case, one can condition on worker- and plant-characteristics available in the
respective data-set, but not on unobservables. Hence, the obtained ownership effect
may be confounded by a selection effect if foreign- and domestic-owned plants
differ in unobserved characteristics. To circumvent this problem, the second method
identifies the wage differential by comparing the change in wages of plants which
change ownership and the change in wages of plants which do not. This is achieved
by fixed effects or difference-in-difference methods, by which unobserved time-
invariant differences between both plant types are swept away. Obviously, this is
only possible if the data are a panel.
If the analysis is based on a LEED panel, one can compare the wage growth of
workers who experience a change in their employer’s ownership status with the
wage growth of workers whose employer’s ownership status does not change. A
reported change in ownership status at the individual level can occur for two
reasons. First, the plant for which an individual works changes its nationality.
Second, the individual moves to another plant with a different ownership status.
While Martins (2004) and Heyman et al. (2007) use the former (and explicitly rely
on workers staying in the same plant) to identify the ownership differential, the
studies of Pesola (2007) and Balsvik (2006) are based on movement of workers.2 To
the best of our knowledge, no study derives (and contrasts) separate estimates of the
ownership wage differential based on the two alternative sources of ownership
variation.
Some studies only investigate the effect of becoming foreign-owned (Martins
2004; Heyman et al. 2007; Girma and Go¨rg 2007) or restrict the effects of going
from domestic to foreign and of going from foreign to domestic as being equal and
2 Earle and Telegdy (2008) also uses LEED, but in their data workers cannot be tracked over time due to
the omission of workers’ identification codes.
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opposite (Earle and Telegdy 2008). Conyon et al. (2002) is the only study at the
plant level which also considers the effect of changing from foreign- to domestic-
owned, although their control group comprises plants of both ownership types not
changing their status. Balsvik (2006) looks separately at both directions of
movement at the individual-level. In separate regressions, she compares movers to
non-multinationals and movers to multinationals with stayers. The reference group
comprises in the first case stayers in non-multinationals, and in the second case
stayers in multinationals. Pesola (2007) specifies a regression model which includes
a foreign ownership dummy and its interaction with tenure and which allows the
impact of previous experience to vary with the ownership of the previous and the
current employer (such that there are four groups: domestic–domestic; domestic–
foreign; foreign–domestic and foreign–foreign). Almeida (2007) estimates firm-
level wage equations, but restricts the sample to those workers who remain in the
plant before and after takeover.
All studies report that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages; this is considered a
well-established stylized fact. The differential appears to be much larger in less
developed countries: the reported (raw) wage differential amounts to 65% for Ghana,
ranges between 67 and 90% for Indonesia, but lies somewhere between 10 and 30%
for developed countries. In every case the differential reduces significantly after
including human capital variables of the workers and/or characteristics of the plant, of
which sectoral affiliation and plant size seem to be the most important. Nevertheless,
if unobserved factors are not taken into account, a positive foreign wage differential
remains. This is typically around 10% and the difference between developed and less-
developed countries is much less pronounced. There is, of course, some variation
between countries, but this may at least partly reflect different sets (or qualities) of
control variables. However, those studies which also account for unobserved factors
by using fixed-effects methods often find that the differential is even smaller and
sometimes insignificantly different from zero. For example, Almeida (2007) finds that
the great majority of the wage difference is pre-existing before takeover, and that the
wage gains for workers who remain in the firm are insignificantly different from zero.
It is often found that the foreign ownership wage differential rises with skill
(Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Earle and Telegdy (2008) for Hungary,
Lipsey and Sjo¨holm (2004) for Indonesia, Velde and Morrissey (2001) for sub-
Saharan countries).3 According to Go¨rg et al. (2007), one explanation for this is that
firm-specific training is more productive in foreign firms. Using data for Ghana, the
authors can provide evidence for their hypothesis by distinguishing between
whether individuals work in domestic or foreign-owned plants, and whether they
receive on-the-job training. Relatedly, Pesola (2007) finds that the positive wage
effect of prior experience in foreign-owned plants is driven by the effect on the
earnings of highly educated.
In this paper we present the first evidence for the effects of foreign ownership on
German plants and workers using LEED. We provide comprehensive evidence
consistent with the idea that foreign firms ‘‘select’’ high-wage plants and high-wage
3 This is not supported, however, by the findings of Buckley and Enderwick (1983) and Girma and Go¨rg
(2007) for the United Kingdom.
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workers. We also present some evidence that the wage gains from working in a
foreign-owned plant are not lost when workers move to domestic firms, consistent
with the idea that wage gains are the result of human capital accumulation.
3 Measuring direct wage effects of foreign ownership
Let yit be worker i’s wage in period t. There are only two waves, t = 1 (namely
2000) and t = 2 (2004). The sample is all workers who are observed twice. In each
period, the identity of a worker’s plant is given by j = J(i, t). In words, worker i in
period t belongs to plant j. Note that the ownership status of worker i’s current plant
may change either because the worker moves from one plant to another of different
ownership status, or because the plant itself changes status.
The simplest framework in which to consider the wage effects of ownership is a
standard linear two-way error components model:
yit ¼ z0itb þ dFjt þ kDt þ hi þ wj þ eit; t ¼ 1; 2: ð1Þ
The vector of observable characteristics zit comprises those which vary across
individual workers, and those which vary across individual plants. The variable Fjt
is unity if the worker’s plant is foreign owned and zero otherwise. Dt is a period two
dummy; k measures the change in standard macro effects between t = 1 and t = 2.
Following Abowd et al. (1999), hi and wj represent unobserved components of
wages which are time-invariant at the individual and plant level respectively. hi
might be thought of as ‘‘unobserved ability‘‘, while wj might be related to the
unobserved fixed productivity of a particular plant, if we think that more productive
plants pay higher wages. As both might be correlated with foreign ownership, we
have a two-way fixed-effects model. eit is an idiosyncratic error, and is assumed
strictly exogenous, such that Eðeitjz0it; Fjt; Dt; hi; wjÞ ¼ 0:
3.1 Defining the treatment and comparison groups
In the light of the literature on policy evaluation, we think of a change in ownership
as a ‘‘treatment‘‘ which potentially affects the wage paid to workers in the plant.
This allows us to partition the wage differential between different types of plant in
terms of ‘‘selection’’ and ‘‘takeover‘‘. Selection reflects the fact that plants are not
randomly selected into their ownership status. Takeover measures any additional
wage gain which a change in ownership status yields. Almeida (2007) discusses the
possible motivations for foreign acquisitions of domestic firms. She argues that, in a
regulated labour market with a high cost of restructuring, foreign firms will wish to
select domestic firms which already exhibit desirable characteristics (such as a high-
skill, high-productivity workforce). If this is the case, we will find a large selection
effect without necessarily any additional takeover effect. The advantage of using
LEED is that it allows us to measure selection not only in terms of plant
characteristics, but also in terms of characteristics of workers in that plant.
We wish to estimate the effect on average workers’ wages in domestic plants in
t = 1 of becoming foreign owned in t = 2. Similarly, we wish to estimate the effect
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on average workers’ wages in foreign plants in t = 1 of becoming domestically
owned in t = 2. Some models (such as a standard fixed-effects model) suggest that
these two effects should be equal and opposite, in which case we could pool the two
types of takeover. But we do not wish to impose this restriction because it is
possible that the wage benefits of foreign takeover are not reversed when plants
revert to domestic control. This might be the case, if, for example, the wage gain is
the result of general human capital accumulation. We therefore consider these two
cases separately. To avoid repetition, in what follows we consider only the first case.
Thus we define the first treatment group to be those workers which are in domestic
plants at t = 1 and which are in foreign-owned plants at t = 2. The comparable
control group are those workers which remain in domestic plants at t = 1 and t = 2.
In the first instance, we estimate both selection and takeover effects. In the
literature, the standard model for evaluating policy effects in this case is
yit ¼ z0itb þ dFjt þ cTi þ kDt þ git; t ¼ 1; 2: ð2Þ
Here the time-invariant dummy variable Ti is equal to one if the worker is in the
treatment group and zero otherwise. The error term git ¼ hi  cTi þ wj þ eit
includes wj and eit from Eq. 1. It is also a function of hi because the treatment
dummy Ti only controls for the average difference in hi between the treatment and
control groups. The parameter d is the takeover effect. To see this, note that Fjt is the
interaction between Dt and Ti, and, when covariates are absent, the OLS estimator of
d is the ‘‘raw‘‘ difference-in-difference estimator
bd ¼ DyT  DyC; ð3Þ
where DyT is the change in average wages of workers who are in the treatment
group (those that become foreign owned) and DyC is the change in average wages in
the control group. Equivalently, bd is the average wage of workers in foreign-owned
plants relative to those in domestic-owned plants in t = 2 net of the differential
between the same workers in t = 1, when they were all in domestic-owned plants.
The parameter c is the selection effect discussed earlier. This is because, when
covariates are absent
c^ ¼ yT 1  yC1;
which captures the averaged unobserved difference between foreign- and domestic-
owned plants prior to and including period t = 1. We label d^ and c^ as the Raw DiD
estimators when there are no covariates and the Conditional DiD estimators when
there are.
A variant of this model is to fix covariates at their t = 1 values, because one
might argue that some observables are endogenous as they might themselves
respond to potential foreign ownership effects.
One could estimate Eq. 2 with pooled cross-section data or with panel data. The
raw DiD estimator controls for the average unobserved difference in yit between the
treatment and control groups. The conditional DiD estimator additionally controls
for observable differences. With panel data one can also sweep out the remaining
individual fixed heterogeneity hi - cTi, and one can also control for plant-level
heterogeneity.
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3.2 Controlling for differences in hi
It has been suggested that foreign-owned plants might be more selective in
recruitment (e.g. Dale-Olsen 2003), and employ workers with higher hi, so that
EðhjF ¼ 1Þ[ EðhjF ¼ 0Þ: We label this a worker selection effect.4 To remove
individual-level fixed effects we difference Eq. 1:5
Dyi ¼ Dz0ib þ dFj2 þ k þ ðDwj þ DeiÞ; ð4Þ
where Dyi = yi2 - yi1, Dz0i = z0i2 - z0i1, DFj = Fj2, DD2 = 1, Dwj = wJ(i,2) - wJ(i,1)
and Dei ¼ ei2  ei1: For workers who do not change plant, Dwj = 0. Again, if we
drop the observable covariates, it is easy to see that the OLS estimator of d is again
the raw difference-in-difference estimator d given in Eq. 3. In these models d is
identified by those workers whose Fjt changes. As noted, this occurs either if a plant
changes ownership status or if a worker moves to a plant of another status. With
observable covariates, the two estimators of d no longer coincide. Also note that the
selection effect is no longer directly identified, because Ti is time-invariant.
6 We
label this estimator FE(i).
3.3 Controlling for differences in wj
OLS estimates of Eq. 4 will yield unbiased and consistent estimates of d if Fj2 is
uncorrelated with Dwj. However, although we have a rich set of covariates
(particularly at the plant level), and we can difference out hi, it seems likely that
foreign ownership is correlated with unobservable plant-level determinants of
wages. This is because foreign firms might also select into plants which have some
unobserved productivity advantage so that EðwjF ¼ 1Þ[ EðwjF ¼ 0Þ: With panel
data on plants one can eliminate the wj in the same way as we did for hi, by
collapsing the individual-level data to a plant-level panel:
yjt ¼ z0jtb þ dFjt þ kDt þ hjt þ wj þ ejt:
yjt is the average wage paid in plant j at time t etc. Now take first differences to get:
Dyj ¼ Dz0jb þ dFj2 þ k þ ðDhj þ DejÞ; ð5Þ
where, for example, Dyjt ¼ yjt  yjt1: By analogy with the above, having controlled
for observables, d is the difference-in-difference estimator. Without covariates
bd ¼ DyT  DyC;
where now y refers to plant-level sample means. Again we cannot directly estimate
selection effects. We label this estimator FE(j).
4 Equivalently, workers might have been more productive already before they move to a foreign-owned
plant.
5 With T = 2, differencing and mean-deviating are identical methods.
6 The selection effect can be recovered after estimating Eq. 4, as illustrated in Sect. 5.
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3.4 Controlling for differences in both hi and wj
The problem with aggregating the data to the plant level to difference out plant-level
fixed effects is that estimates of d from Eq. 5 will now be biased and inconsistent if
Dhj is correlated with Fj2. This is so-called aggregation bias, caused by the selection
effect we cannot control for with plant-level data.
One advantage of LEED is that one can eliminate both hi and wj together. To do
this, define a spell, denoted s, as a unique worker-plant pair. In other words, a
worker who changes plant between 2000 and 2004 has two separate spells. Within a
spell both hi and wj are constant (because both i and j are constant) and so one can
eliminate both using ‘‘spell-fixed effects‘‘ (see Abowd et al. (1999) and Andrews
et al. (2006)):
Dyi ¼ Dz0ib þ dFj2 þ k þ Dei i 2 fJði; 1Þ ¼ Jði; 2Þg: ð6Þ
Note that, when estimating Eq. 6, individuals who change plant are not included
in the regression and therefore do not contribute to the estimates of d. Therefore one
way of thinking about spell-fixed effects is that it controls for plant-level
unobservables by only looking at ‘‘stayers‘‘. This is, in fact, essentially the same
method suggested by Martins (2004), which we label FE(s).
Because Eq. 6 ignores information on movers, it is not the most efficient estimate
of d (or any other parameter). In addition, one cannot recover separately estimates
of hi or wj. An alternative method would be to estimate Eq. 4 but include a full set of
(differenced) plant dummies to control for non-random selection on wj. However,
this method is likely to be computationally infeasible since we have many thousands
of plants. A solution to this problem is to use the classical minimum distance
(CMD) estimator outlined in Andrews et al. (2006). It forms a restricted estimator
for b; d; k and w from estimating two models separately. These are Eq. 6, using
stayers, and Eq. 4, using movers, where differenced plant dummies are added to the
latter.7 The CMD estimator allows us to recover estimates of both hi and wj so that
we can analyse selection effects.
To summarise, if the population version of Eq. 1 represents the true process by
which wages are generated, one can obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the
foreign ownership on wages using: Eq. 4 if ownership and hi are correlated; Eq. 5 if
ownership and wj are correlated; and Eq. 6 if ownership is correlated with hi and wj.
More efficient estimates can also be obtained using a CMD estimate which
combines both movers and non-movers.
All of the above is repeated for all foreign-owned plants in t = 1, some of whom
become domestic (the second treatment group) in t = 2.
4 The data and descriptive statistics
There are two data sources. The first is the Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung (IAB) Establishment Panel, an annual survey of approximately
7 See Wooldridge (2002, ch. 14.6) and Andrews et al. (2006) for further details. Because the plant
dummies are only necessary in the movers regression this method is computationally feasible.
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8,250 plants8 located in former West Germany and an additional 7,900 plants in
former East Germany. The survey started in 1993 and is ongoing. It covers 1% of all
plants and 7% of all employment in Germany, and is therefore a sample weighted
toward larger plants. The sample covers all industries. Information is obtained by
personal interviews with plant managers, and comprises about 80 questions per
year, giving us information on, for example, total employment, bargaining
arrangements, total sales, exports, investment, wage bill, location, industry, profit
level and nationality of ownership. Ownership is defined as either West German,
East German, foreign, or public sector.9 Complete information on plant ownership is
available for all plants only in 2000 and 2004, so we restrict our analysis to those
years. A disadvantage of our data is therefore that we are unable to precisely date
the year of acquisition. A detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel can
be found in Ko¨lling (2000).
Table 1 summarises the basic sample which we use for the analysis.10 Only a
small proportion of plants in Germany are foreign owned: 4% of all plants in West
Germany and just 2% of all plants in East Germany. A higher proportion of plants in
the service sector are foreign owned. Turning to the employment shares, foreign
ownership becomes more important. Almost one out of eight workers in West
German manufacturing works for a foreign-owned plant because foreign-owned
plants are on average larger.
As we would expect, there is almost no ownership of West German plants by
East German firms.11 By contrast, there is considerable cross-border ownership of
East German plants by West German firms. About 11% of plants in East Germany
are West German owned and the share of workers employed by theses
establishments is nearly 30%. Because of this, the wage effects of West German–
owned plants in East Germany (compared with those that are East German–owned)
will also be of particular interest in the econometric analysis below.
The second source of data is the employment statistics register of the German
Federal Office of Labour (Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik), which covers all workers or
trainees registered by the social insurance system. The register covers about 80% of
workers in West Germany and about 85% in East Germany. Information on workers
includes basic demographics, start and end dates of employment spells, occupation
and industry, earnings, qualifications (school and post-school), and a plant
identification number. A detailed description of the employment data can be found
in Bender et al. (2000).
8 Note that we have information on plants (or establishments) rather than firms. We are not able to
determine whether individual plants in the survey belong to the same firm, although we do know whether
the plant is one of several plants within a firm.
9 The relevant question is: ‘‘Is the establishment mainly or solely in: (a) West German ownership (b) East
German ownership (c) Foreign ownership (d) Public sector ownership (e) No single owner which holds
majority?’’ Our analysis considers only plants under (a)–(c). We are not therefore able to measure the
share of foreign ownership in a plant.
10 We exclude plants in agriculture, banks and insurances, education, health and the public sector.
11 In our analysis we therefore exclude East German–owned plants in West Germany.
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By using the plant identification number we can associate each worker with a
plant in the panel. We therefore observe approximately 80% of all workers in about
14,000 plants each year. Because the employment register is spell-based (one record
for each employment spell), the combined data is potentially complex. To simplify,
we select all workers in the employment register who are employed by the surveyed
plants on June 30th each year. This yields an unbalanced annual panel of workers
together with detailed information on the plants in which they work. We refer to the
linked data as the Linked IAB Panel, or LIAB.
Reported daily gross wages are censored at the social security contribution
ceiling.12 Using wage data without any correction would generally yield estimates
which are biased toward zero. One way to circumvent this problem is to apply a
single imputation procedure, i.e. to impute all censored wages with estimated
wages. Assuming that daily gross wages have a log-normal distribution, first a Tobit
model is estimated, where the dependent variable is log daily gross wage and the
independent variables are those included in further analyses. Then, for every
censored observation a random value is drawn from a normal distribution which is
left-truncated at the social security contribution ceiling (with predicted log wage as
its mean and standard deviation as estimated from the Tobit model).13
Because the plant-level information in our data come from a survey, rather than
an administrative source, we have a large number of measurable covariates, shown
in Table 4. We have rather less information on workers, shown in Table 5.
Table 1 Incidence and coverage of different forms of ownership (percentages)
West Germany East Germany
Manuf. Services All Manuf. Services All
Share of plants
West German-owned 97.9 95.0 95.8 9.1 12.6 11.4
East German-owned 0.1 0.2 0.2 89.7 85.0 86.5
Foreign-owned 2.1 4.8 4.0 1.3 2.5 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of workers
West German-owned 87.8 92.7 90.5 28.7 27.2 27.9
East German-owned 0.1 0.2 0.1 63.0 69.1 66.3
Foreign-owned 12.1 7.1 9.4 8.3 3.7 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: IAB Establishment Panel; 2000 and 2004; weighted figures
12 The ceiling is in 2000 at €143.92 for West and at €118.81 for East Germany. In 2004, the respective
figures are €166.10 and €114.30. In our regression sample, 12.1 (5.5)% of the wage observations from
2000 in West (East) Germany are censored, while in 2004 10.9% (4.5%) of workers are affected.
13 See Gartner (2005) for further details.
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5 Results
All our estimates can be thought of as variants of the basic difference-in-differences
estimator described in Sect. 3, where we control for observables, and worker-level
and plant-level unobserved heterogeneity.
We define the following dummy variables to measure the ownership status of a
worker’s plant in period t:
EJ(i,t)t = 1 if worker i is in an East German-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
WJ(i,t)t = 1 if worker i is in an West German-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
FJ(i,t)t = 1 if worker i is in a foreign-owned plant in period t, 0 otherwise
For West German plants, we do not distinguish between East German-owned and
foreign-owned plants because we have so few of the former. Therefore we have only
two treatment and control groups, defined by the following dummies:
TWF ¼
1 if FJði;1Þ1 ¼ 0 and FJði;2Þ2 ¼ 1
0 if FJði;1Þ1 ¼ 0 and FJði;2Þ2 ¼ 0
(
TFW ¼
1 if FJði;1Þ1 ¼ 1 and FJði;2Þ2 ¼ 0
0 if FJði;1Þ1 ¼ 1 and FJði;2Þ2 ¼ 1
(
The basic model is Eq. 2, which allows us to directly estimate both the selection
effect and the takeover effect. This is now written as
yit ¼ a þ z0itb þ dFFjt þ cWFTWF þ kDt þ git ð7Þ
for plants which are domestic at t = 1, and
yit ¼ a þ z0itb þ dW Wjt þ cFW TFW þ kDt þ git ð8Þ
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1. There are analogous versions of Eqs.
4–6 which estimate dF using FE(i), FE(j) and FE(s) respectively.
For plants in East Germany there are six treatment and three control groups. For
example, TEW defines the group of plants who are domestic at t = 1 and become
West German, while TEF defines the group who become foreign. Similarly we have
TWE and TWF for plants which are West German at t = 1 and TFE, TFW for plants
which are foreign at t = 1. The three variants of (2) for East Germany are therefore
yit ¼ a þ z0itb þ dW Wjt þ dFFjt þ cEW TEW þ cEFTEF þ kDt þ git ð9Þ
for plants which are domestic at t = 1,
yit ¼ a þ z0itb þ dEEjt þ dFFjt þ cWETWE þ cWFTWF þ kDt þ git ð10Þ
for plants which are West German-owned at t = 1 and
yit ¼ a þ z0itb þ dEEjt þ dWWjt þ cFETFE þ cFW TFW þ kDt þ git ð11Þ
for plants which are foreign-owned at t = 1.
The number of workers and plants for the different treatment and control groups
in our regression sample is shown in the Appendix 1 Tables 6 and 7, which also
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stratify between plant-stayers and movers. Consider Table 6, for West German
plants. Each row represents a separate sample since we split between plants based
on their ownership status in 2000. The columns represent those treated/not treated.
Table 7 has the same structure, but for East Germany, where there are three possible
treatment groups.
The dummy variable TWF, for example, takes on the value of zero for the control
group of 146,482 workers in West Germany, working for West German-owned
plants in both years. 139,858 of these stay in the same (1,503) plants which are West
German-owned in 2000 and in 2004. The remaining 6,624 move between West
German-owned establishments. While stayers work for plants which are, by
construction, observed in both 2000 and 2004, this is not necessarily the case for
movers. The group of the 6,624 movers worked for 1,238 plants which are observed
in either 2000 or 2004, and for 122 plants which are observed in both years.
The corresponding treatment group (i.e. TWF = 1) consists of 12,426 workers
whose employing plant is West German-owned in 2000 and foreign-owned in 2004.
The observed change can occur for two reasons: First, 11,976 stayers work for 36
plants which are taken over between 2000 and 2004; and second, 450 workers move
from West German-owned to foreign-owned establishments. The estimated
selection and takeover effects are identified by both types of workers. In contrast
to previous studies, which relied either on stayers or on movers, in the analysis
below we compare results based on the two sources of ownership change.
5.1 West Germany
Results for West Germany are summarised in Table 2. Row (1) shows the raw
difference-in-difference (DiD) estimates of both the selection and takeover effects.
Our first basic result is that domestic plants which are taken over pay significantly
higher wages before they are taken over. This selection effect is the coefficient on
TWF, cWF, estimated at 0.115 log-points. Similarly, foreign-owned plants which
become domestic pay lower wages (-0.061) before they become domestic, but this
effect is insignificantly different from zero (p-value 0.325). Then, for domestic-
owned plants, there is an additional boost to wages of d^ ¼ 0:043 log-points after
foreign takeover. This takeover effect is almost mirrored by plants which switch
from foreign to domestic (-0.038 log-points). In the raw data therefore, foreign
firms appear to take over higher-paying domestic plants, but also boost wages after
takeover. Foreign-owned plants which revert to domestic ownership do not pay
significantly lower wages, but wages do drop significantly afterwards.
The raw DiD estimate of the selection effect captures permanent differences in
wages between plants which change ownership status and those that do not. These
large differences (estimated to be about 10%) may in part be due to differences in
observed worker and plant characteristics. For example, plants which get taken over
may be larger or in higher-paying industries. Incorporating a full set of controls in
the conditional DiD regression (as expected) reduces the estimate of cWF from 0.115
to 0.056, shown in Row (2). The estimate of cFW for plants which change from
foreign to domestic changes sign and becomes positive and significant. In the raw
data there appears to be negative selection: lower-paying plants switch from foreign
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to domestic. But this is due to differences in zit. The inclusion of covariates also
reduces the takeover effect a lot: it reduces to 0.025 log points for switching from
domestic to foreign, and it is virtually zero for plants which become domestic.
Because this is an individual-level wage equation, the estimates of dF and dW are
driven both by plants which change their ownership status and by individuals who
switch between plants of different ownership status. If movement and ownership
status are correlated, this might bias our DiD estimates. It is straightforward to
control for this by looking at wages only of individuals who remain in the same
plant, shown in Row (3). This reduces the takeover effect for plants which switch
from domestic to foreign slightly (0.021 log-points), while the effect is larger for
Table 2 Results for plants in West Germany
Domestic in 2000 Foreign in 2000
Individual level Plant level Individual level Plant level
(1) Raw DiD
cWF 0.115 (0.044)*** 0.226 (0.058)*** cFW -0.061 (0.062) -0.086 (0.101)
dF 0.043 (0.016)*** 0.040 (0.009)*** dW -0.038 (0.020)* -0.000 (0.019)
(2) Conditional DiD
cWF 0.056 (0.020)*** 0.015 (0.034) cFW 0.030 (0.016)* 0.006 (0.035)
dF 0.025 (0.008)*** 0.025 (0.013)** dW -0.002 (0.016) -0.005 (0.021)
(3) Conditional DiD, stayers only
cWF 0.046 (0.020)** 0.010 (0.033) cFW 0.030 (0.019) 0.010 (0.035)
dF 0.021 (0.009)** 0.029 (0.016)* dW -0.006 (0.015) -0.007 (0.021)
(4) Conditional DiD, movers only
cWF 0.022 (0.017) cFW -0.010 (0.019)
dF 0.055 (0.029)* dW -0.019 (0.027)
(5) Conditional DiD, covariates fixed at t = 1, Stayers only
cWF 0.043 (0.019)** 0.007 (0.033) cFW 0.048 (0.018)*** 0.020 (0.032)
dF 0.041 (0.017)** 0.045 (0.012)*** dW -0.014 (0.010) 0.005 (0.021)
(6) Conditional FE(i)
dF 0.029 (0.008)*** dW -0.008 (0.009)
(7) Conditional FE(j)
dF 0.037 (0.011)*** dW 0.003 (0.017)
(8) Raw FE(s)
dF 0.041 (0.017)** dW -0.014 (0.010)
(9) Conditional FE(s)
dF 0.027 (0.009)*** dW -0.011 (0.010)
(10) Conditional CMD
dF 0.027 (0.009)*** dW -0.011 (0.010)
Notes: reports estimates of Eqs. 7 and 8 plus versions of Eqs. 4–6. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the plant level. All conditional estimates include all covariates listed in Appendix 1 Tables 4
and 5
Key: *** indicates p B 0.01, ** indicates 0.01 \ p B 0.05, * indicates 0.05 \ p B 0.1
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movers (0.055 log-points).14 With respect to the change from foreign to domestic,
the takeover effect is insignificantly different from zero for both stayers and movers.
However, the positive selection effect is only observed for stayers.
It has been suggested that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages because they
provide greater investment in human capital. If this human capital was general, the
wage effects of foreign-ownership should be maintained when workers move from
foreign-owned to domestic-owned establishments. Hence, we would expect to see
smaller wage losses for movers from foreign to domestic plants than wage gains for
movers from domestic to foreign. In fact—keeping in mind the relatively low
number of movers—there is evidence for this in the conditional DiD estimates,
shown in Row (4). Movers to foreign plants gain 0.055 log-points, while the loss for
those who move to domestic plants is smaller and insignificantly different from
zero.
The models estimated above allow the covariates to vary between 2000 and 2004.
A change in ownership status, however, may cause changes in wages and changes in
the observable characteristics of the plant. For example, a plant which becomes
foreign-owned may grow larger and pay higher wages. By including zit in the
regression we incorrectly ‘‘control for‘‘ these changes. One way of dealing with this
bias is to measure covariates only at the pre-takeover values in 2000. This of course
is only meaningful for those individuals who remain in the same plant. The result,
shown in Row (5), is that the estimated effect of becoming foreign-owned rises
again to 0.041 log-points.15
Exploiting the panel nature of the data, we can control for worker-level fixed
effects hi using Eq. 4, shown in Row (6). We can control for plant-level fixed effects
wj using Eq. 5, shown in Row (7). Both hi and wj can be controlled for by using Eq.
6, shown in Rows (8) and (9). Conditioning on covariates, we find that foreign
takeover of domestic plants does boost wages, but only by about 0.027 log-points.
This is smaller than the selection effect for stayers. Domestic takeover of foreign
plants appears to have a smaller, negative and statistically insignificant effect of
-0.011. However, given the relatively large standard errors on these two estimates,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of takeover is equal and opposite.
The final row (10) reports estimates from the classical minimum distance (CMD)
method. This method controls for both individual- and plant-fixed effects, and
(unlike spell-fixed effects) includes both movers and non-movers. Reassuringly, we
find that the CMD estimates are almost identical to the spell-fixed effects estimates,
and so our preferred estimates appear robust to the choice of method.
As noted in Sect. 3, it is also possible to estimate wage effects at the level of the
plant. This is useful not least for comparison with the existing literature. Our
estimates of the selection effect are generally bigger in the raw data (0.226 and
-0.086). Without covariates, the individual-level estimates are just a re-weighting
of the plant level estimates, with larger plants having a higher weight. This shows
14 The overall DiD estimate is a weighted average of the movers’ and non-movers’ estimates. As can be
seen from Table 6, only a small fraction of the sample comprise movers (4.6% of the workers in West
Germany working for West German-owned plants in 2000).
15 In fact, this specification means that zit is a fixed effect, and so this estimator gives identical estimates
of dF and dW as the raw DiD for plant-stayers.
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that the selection effect is bigger for smaller plants. We would therefore expect that
the inclusion of covariates (including plant size) in the plant-level estimates would
reduce the selection effect, and this is indeed what happens. Comparing Row (6)
with Row (7) we find that the resulting estimates of dF are slightly large from plant-
level data, but that the estimates are within one standard error. This reflects the fact
that our plant-level data includes plant-level averages of worker characteristics. One
might conclude therefore that provided one controls for the average quality of the
workforce in a plant, plant-level estimates are an adequate way of measuring the
takeover effect. Of course, such detailed measures of the workforce are only
typically available from LEED.
5.2 East Germany
The East German results are more complex because there are three treatment/
control groups, and two possible treatments for each group as shown in Eqs. 9–11.
In Table 3 we report the two selection effects and the two takeover effects for each
possible group at t = 1.
The raw DiD estimates in Row (1) show first of all that the selection effect for
domestic plants in 2000 is much larger than in West Germany. Plants which change
from domestic to West German pay 0.195 log-points more than those who remain
domestic; plants which become foreign even pay 0.309 more. Once these large
selection effects are taken into account, however, the takeover effect on wages is
small and insignificantly different from zero. Selection effects for West German-
owned and foreign-owned plants in 2000 are much smaller and insignificantly
different from zero. Once again, the large selection effects for domestic plants
which become foreign-owned or West German-owned is consistent with the idea
that higher-paying plants are those which get taken over. The selection effects
reduce when covariates are taken into account (Row 2), but remain substantial.16
Rows (3) and (4) show that these selection effects differ widely between stayers
and movers. Workers who remain in the same plant have even larger selection
effects, while they are insignificantly different from zero for workers who move.
Note however that the selection effect is large and negative (albeit poorly
determined) for movers from plants which were foreign-owned in 2000.
Our preferred estimates for the takeover effect are those which control for both
worker- and plant-fixed effects, labeled FE(s), Row (9). In almost every case we
find small and insignificant effects. The only exception is a fall of -0.044 log points
for West German-owned plants which become domestic. Thus, we find that while
selection is greater in East Germany, there is less evidence that takeover has any
additional effect on wages. Larger selection effects in East Germany is consistent
with the idea that the base group of plants (those which are not taken over) are less
technologically advanced than the equivalent base group in West Germany.17
16 It is also consistent with a model in which the effects of foreign ownership on wages take a long time
(more than 4 years) to develop.
17 Temouri et al. (2008) find that the productivity gap between foreign-owned and domestic plants is
greater in the Eastern states.
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5.3 Selection effects at the plant level and the individual level
Using the preferred fixed-effects methods, such as FE(s) or CMD, means that the
parameter identifying the selection effect is not directly estimated. For example, in
Eq. 6, the treatment dummy T is swept away by the within-spell transformation.
However, using CMD we can recover estimates of both the worker and the plant
fixed component of wages, denoted hi and wj. This allows us to compare their mean
or their distribution between the treatment and control groups of each type.
In Fig. 1 we plot the distribution of our estimates of wj and hi for the control and
treatment groups corresponding to those West German plants which were domestic
in 2000.
In both cases, as we would expect, we find that the distribution of the fixed
unobserved component of wages for the treatment group lies to the right of that for
the control group. This is another way of showing the selection effect, but one which
decomposes the selection effect into two components: one relating to the plant, and
one to the worker. The difference in the mean of h^i is about 0.16 log-points, while
the difference in w^j is about 0.058. In both cases, foreign takeover is associated with
higher fixed worker- and plant-level characteristics, although it seems that the
worker-level effect is quantitatively more important.18
5.4 Heterogeneity in the foreign ownership effect
Even if the average effect of changing ownership status is small, it might be that this
disguises some larger or smaller effects for subgroups in the data. For example,
foreign-owned plants might implement a steeper wage-tenure profile, or might
reward highly-skilled workers relatively more. The effects of foreign-owned plants
might also vary by characteristics such as size and profitability. A further benefit of
LEED is that we can disaggregate the foreign ownership effect by both worker
characteristics and plant characteristics.
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psi (unobserved plant effect, West Germany, domestic in 2000)
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Fig. 1 Estimated distribution of unobserved fixed wage components, West German plants
18 Plant effects are only plotted for establishments which are observed twice. The difference in the
distributions of the worker effects does not depend on whether only stayers, only movers or (as in the
figure) all workers are included.
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To enable comparison of a large number of coefficient estimates, we use
graphical methods. In Fig. 2 we plot the estimate of dF for each subgroup of the
data, together with its 95% confidence interval. For reference we also draw vertical
lines showing the FE(s) pooled estimate of dF = 0.027 and the null hypothesis
dF = 0. The subgroups we choose are based on those covariates described in
Appendix 1 Tables 4 and 5, and include worker and plant characteristics.
Figure 2 enables us to see at a glance that confidence intervals for almost all
subgroups of the data include the pooled estimate, and most also include zero, which
partly reflects the fact that the pooled estimate itself is only 0.027 with a standard
error of 0.009. Thus we find little evidence that takeover effects are much larger or
much smaller for subgroups of the data. The only notable exceptions are for workers
in service occupations and for plants in the service sector, where there is evidence of
larger takeover effects. The coefficient on dF for service sector plants, for example,
is 0.060. Thus, foreign plants do not appear to reward more highly-skilled
occupations or more highly qualified individuals more.
In Fig. 3 we repeat the exercise, but look at the takeover effect from domestic to
foreign in East Germany. As Table 3 shows, our preferred pooled estimate for the
dF is effectively zero (0.011), and most subgroups have confidence intervals which
include zero. Exceptions are workers in engineering and managerial occupations,
which have much larger takeover effects, and workers in plants with high levels of
exports.
Finally, Fig. 4 plots estimates and confidence intervals for the West German
takeover effect. Once again, there is very little evidence here that takeover effects
are significantly different from zero for any subgroup of the population, with the
exception of one occupational group (professionals). Taken as a whole, these results
confirm that once selection is taken into account, the true takeover effect is small for
most groups.
Male
Female
Basic manual occ.
Qualified manual occ.
Engineering occ.
Basic service occ.
Qualified service occ.
Semi−professional occ.
Professional occ.
Basic business occ.
Qualified business occ.
Managerial occ.
No quals.
Apprenticeship
Abitur
Apprenticeship & Abitur
Technical degree
University degree
Tenure <8 years
Tenure >8 years
Manufacturing
Services
<20 employees
>200 employees
Good profits
Bad profits
Low exports
High exports
−0.050 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150
Fig. 2 FE(s) estimates of dF, West Germany, plants which are West German-owned in 2000
The takeover and selection effects of foreign-owned establishments 311
123
6 Conclusion
We have shown how the treatment-effects framework can be used to estimate the
‘‘selection‘‘ and ‘‘takeover’’ components of the wage differential between foreign-
and domestic-owned plants. With LEED it is possible to use this framework to
isolate the effects of selection on both plant and worker unobservable components
of wages.
We find evidence of large selection effects both in terms of worker- and plant
unobserved components of wages: plants which get taken over by foreign firms have
Male
Female
Basic manual occ.
Qualified manual occ.
Engineering occ.
Basic service occ.
Qualified service occ.
Semi−professional occ.
Professional occ.
Basic business occ.
Qualified business occ.
Managerial occ.
No quals.
Apprenticeship
Abitur
Apprenticeship & Abitur
Technical degree
University degree
Tenure <8 years
Tenure >8 years
Manufacturing
Services
<20 employees
>200 employees
Good profits
Bad profits
Low exports
High exports
−0.200 −0.100 0.000 0.100 0.200
Fig. 4 FE(s) estimates of dW, East Germany, plants which are East German-owned in 2000
Male
Female
Basic manual occ.
Qualified manual occ.
Engineering occ.
Basic service occ.
Qualified service occ.
Semi−professional occ.
Professional occ.
Basic business occ.
Qualified business occ.
Managerial occ.
No quals.
Apprenticeship
Abitur
Apprenticeship & Abitur
Technical degree
University degree
Tenure <8 years
Tenure >8 years
Manufacturing
Services
<20 employees
>200 employees
Good profits
Bad profits
Low exports
High exports
−0.200 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600
Fig. 3 FE(s) estimates of dF, East Germany, plants which are East German-owned in 2000
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higher plant-level wages and higher individual-level wages before they are taken
over. The selection effects are larger for East German plants, both for those which
change to West German ownership and foreign ownership. Once the selection effect
is taken into account, the genuine takeover effect is small and in some cases
insignificantly different from zero. In contrast to the selection effect, the takeover
effect is slightly larger in West Germany. The finding that the selection effects
account for almost all the wage differences between foreign and domestic plants is
consistent with evidence for other European countries which comes from LEED,
such as Almeida (2007) and Martins (2004).
The framework we use also distinguishes between plants which change
ownership status from domestic to foreign and vice versa. Most previous studies
impose the restriction that these two effects are equal and opposite, as they would be
if there was a simple wage bonus paid to workers in foreign-owned plants. In West
Germany the takeover effect is 2.7% in one direction and -1.1% in the other
direction. However, the latter is insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that
workers do not suffer a significant wage loss when their plant reverts to domestic
ownership. In addition, workers who leave foreign-owned plants and join domestic
plants do not experience wage falls (as opposed to a wage increase of 5.5% for
workers who leave domestically owned plants and join foreign-owned). Our results
also show that the wage gains to workers who move from a domestic to a foreign
plant are larger than the wage gains to stayers who remain in a plant which changes
ownership status. This sheds light on the process by which foreign-owned plants
become high-paying establishments. Rather than paying higher wages to existing
workers, they take on new higher-paid workers.
The use of linked data on workers and plants allows us to investigate whether
there are any distributional consequences of ownership status. We split the sample
by a number of possibly relevant characteristics and re-estimate the takeover effect.
We find little evidence that takeover effects are much larger or much smaller for
subgroups of the data. In particular, there is no systematic pattern in terms of skill or
occupational groups: foreign-owned plants do not appear to change the reward
structure within plants significantly once selection effects are accounted for.
One interpretation of these results is that the true impacts of ownership structure
on the labour market are small, at least in Germany in the 21st century. It seems
possible that foreign firms find it difficult to change the wage structure of pre-
existing German plants. Finally, we would also stress that, in these data, we cannot
identify plants which are owned by German multinationals. Recent evidence from
Temouri et al. (2008) shows that the productivity advantage of ‘‘foreign‘‘ firms in
Germany disappears if one compares German multinational enterprises with foreign
firms.
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Appendix 1: Sample means
Table 4 Plant-level sample means by location and ownership status
West Germany East Germany
West Foreign East West Foreign
Size Number of workers 284.601 590.581 38.237 150.450 236.558
— Mining, energy 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.019 0.025
Ind2 Food 0.044 0.027 0.039 0.041 0.067
Ind3 Consumer goods 0.070 0.072 0.035 0.039 0.049
Ind4 Producer goods 0.127 0.293 0.162 0.220 0.252
Ind5 Investment goods 0.205 0.313 0.212 0.319 0.356
Ind6 Construction 0.127 0.025 0.217 0.079 0.092
Ind7 Trade 0.196 0.122 0.143 0.159 0.074
Ind8 Transport and communications 0.042 0.037 0.033 0.018 0.025
Ind9 Catering 0.026 0.019 0.022 0.005 0.006
Ind10 Business services 0.125 0.056 0.091 0.084 0.037
Ind11 Other services 0.025 0.019 0.035 0.016 0.018
— Population [ 500,000 (central) 0.283 0.353 0.097 0.124 0.147
Urban2 Population [ 500,000 (outskirts) 0.060 0.047 0.039 0.062 0.037
Urban3 Population 100,000–500,000 (central) 0.189 0.200 0.130 0.175 0.178
Urban4 Population 100,000–500,000 (outskirts) 0.141 0.109 0.124 0.117 0.110
Urban5 Population 50,000–100,000 (central) 0.022 0.014 0.044 0.037 0.061
Urban6 Population 50,000–100,000 (outskirts) 0.063 0.054 0.152 0.127 0.117
Urban7 Population 20,000–50,000 0.110 0.113 0.171 0.172 0.153
Urban8 Population 5,000–20,000 0.090 0.085 0.122 0.101 0.098
Urban9 Population 2,000–5,000 0.027 0.016 0.072 0.045 0.067
Urban10 Population \ 2,0000 0.016 0.010 0.048 0.040 0.031
Single Plant not part of larger firm 0.710 0.282 0.947 0.557 0.503
B1 Sectoral bargaining agreement 0.611 0.691 0.266 0.388 0.534
B2 Firm-level bargaining agreement 0.060 0.080 0.075 0.128 0.123
Inv Investment (relative to median) 148.899 355.623 16.258 81.403 157.100
Conc Herfindahl concentration index (three-digit) 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.015
— Profits ‘‘very good’’ 0.047 0.080 0.038 0.048 0.067
Profit2 Profits ‘‘good‘‘ 0.282 0.291 0.283 0.327 0.380
Profit3 Profits ‘‘satisfactory’’ 0.342 0.280 0.370 0.342 0.276
Profit4 Profits ‘‘just sufficient‘‘ 0.202 0.188 0.191 0.162 0.172
Profit5 Profits ‘‘bad’’ 0.127 0.161 0.118 0.122 0.104
Vin Age of plant (years) 18.371 17.751 8.599 8.361 8.687
Exp Proportion of exports in total sales 0.121 0.354 0.028 0.102 0.267
No. of observations 4,136 515 2,212 872 163
No. of plants 2,632 401 1,257 574 117
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Appendix 2: Regression sample
Table 5 Individual-level sample means by location and ownership status
West Germany East Germany
West Foreign East West Foreign
Wage Daily wage in € reported 104.246 114.421 61.572 80.005 83.055
Wage Daily wage in € imputed 107.288 120.774 61.908 81.616 84.321
Female Female 0.170 0.182 0.269 0.235 0.235
Foreign Foreign 0.098 0.125 0.002 0.006 0.006
Age Age 41.898 41.855 42.772 43.129 43.129
— Without apprenticeship or Abitur 0.171 0.203 0.020 0.043 0.043
Qual2 Apprenticeship, no Abitur 0.671 0.596 0.803 0.759 0.759
Qual3 No apprenticeship, with Abitur 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002
Qual4 With apprenticeship and Abitur 0.028 0.027 0.019 0.022 0.022
Qual5 Technical college degree 0.050 0.071 0.044 0.064 0.064
Qual6 University education 0.042 0.074 0.050 0.066 0.066
Qual7 Education unknown 0.033 0.022 0.061 0.045 0.045
— Basic manual occupation 0.320 0.378 0.260 0.335 0.335
Occ2 Qualified manual occupation 0.220 0.155 0.332 0.218 0.218
Occ3 Engineers and technicians 0.160 0.198 0.102 0.126 0.126
Occ4 Basic service occupation 0.088 0.051 0.100 0.125 0.125
Occ5 Qualified service occupation 0.014 0.003 0.020 0.005 0.005
Occ6 Semi-professional 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.007
Occ7 Professional 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003
Occ8 Basic business occupation 0.041 0.045 0.039 0.027 0.027
Occ9 Qualified business occupation 0.131 0.121 0.111 0.113 0.113
Occ10 Manager 0.018 0.041 0.031 0.042 0.042
Tenure Tenure in years 12.444 11.544 7.585 8.097 8.097
No. of observations 309,889 87,697 27,405 50,056 17,155
No. of individuals 163,407 52,311 15,628 28,145 10,348
Table 6 West Germany
Ownership in 2004
Domestic Foreign
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
Ownership in 2000
Domestic 139,858 (0–1,503) 6,624 (1,238–122) 11,976 (0–36) 450 a
Foreign 3,754 (0–20) 745 (366–4) 34,975 (0–114) 411 (161–21)
Number of workers (number of plants observed once–twice). All workers included in both years
a Total number of plants in cell too small to report
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